Thursday, April 21, 2011
Great Friday
After the eruption of numerous protests all over Syria, al-Asad's iron-clad Baath rule accepted to abolish the emergency law which had been in use since 1963, along with the end to the State Security Courts. First concessions.. We will see whether or not new compromises will follow... Being content with the decision, the opposition aspires to see more reforms such as the establishment of an independent judiciary...One opposition activist argued that "as long as the judiciary works in tandem with the Baath party and the Security forces, there is no genuine reform on the ground." The revolutionary fervor does not seem to die down... Today, as they name "Great Friday," Syrians will come together to renew their call for change...
Islamist TV Channel
Muslim Brotherhood is launching a new TV Channel (Egypt 25) in order to promote for its newly established political party, "Freedom and Justice Party." The number "25" refers to the day, when the Egyptian Revolution started, namely January 25th.http://vladtepesblog.com/?p=32708
Friday, April 1, 2011
Latest Syrian Protests
It is impossible not to witness the misinformation of the Syrian official press about the latest protests in Syria. When the protests became widespread all over the Arab and the Western Press, there was nearly no news about the demonstrations in the Syrian newspapers, which are the mouthpiece of the Asad regime. When the protests spread out the country which led to the killings of hundreds by the Syrian security forces, the coverage of the incidents increased as the protesters were depicted as "the instrument of the foreign powers" or "traitors." Today, the rally entitled "Martyrs' Friday" led to the death of 13 civilians, but the Syrian Press announced that "the protests were peaceful." Moreover, DP-news accused some Arab(most probably Al-jazeera) and foreign press members of mobilizing the Syrian public and creating chaos in the society!
Tuesday, March 8, 2011
Legalization of Islamist Parties in Egypt
After the toppling of the Mubarak regime, the Islamist parties, which rejected violence, have begun to be legalized by the new interim military regime. The Wasat (Center) Party, which was formed by the soft-liners splitting off from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) after a schism, had finally received the official recognition from the Egyptian state after a nearly 15 year struggle to be legalized. Despite its moderation from the Muslim Brotherhood ideals, such as introducing the concept of "citizenship" which includes Christian Arabs (Coptics) alongside Muslim Arabs, and accepting both women and Coptics as presidential candidates in Egypt. The Wasat party aims to achieve political reform, pluralism, rule of law, and economic growth in the country. The first sign of being a moderate Islamist party (in comparison with the MB) is its decision not to mention "shari'ah" in its party program. Instead, it uses a loose term of "Arab-Islamic civilization," which gives it a more inclusionary and pluralistic character vis-a-vis the non-Muslims in Egyptian society. Due to this peaceful coexistence, the party argues, today Egypt has a distinguished position concerning its multicolor social life.
In addition to the Wasat Party, the Muslim Brotherhood also announced that it will establish a political party, under the name, "The Freedom and Justice Party." The MB declared that it opens up its doors to all of the Egyptian society. However, the MB differs from the Wasat party in that they refuse to accept the leadership of women and Coptics for the presidency. On this particular issue, the party seemed to be pretty rigid. Since the movement was not allowed to participate in the parliament as a legal political party (only as independent MPs), it did not really felt the need to engage in concessions in order to be viable in the political arena. Right now, the MB does not seem to be willing to separate its da'wah (propaganda) section from its political body, unlike the Moroccan Justice and Development Party and Jordanian Islamic Action Front. However, in the following days, as the party completes its transformation from a "social movement" to a "political party," and as it indulges in the complexity of working on socio-economic programs, we will see whether or not it will decide to pursue an institutional differentiation.
In addition to the Wasat Party, the Muslim Brotherhood also announced that it will establish a political party, under the name, "The Freedom and Justice Party." The MB declared that it opens up its doors to all of the Egyptian society. However, the MB differs from the Wasat party in that they refuse to accept the leadership of women and Coptics for the presidency. On this particular issue, the party seemed to be pretty rigid. Since the movement was not allowed to participate in the parliament as a legal political party (only as independent MPs), it did not really felt the need to engage in concessions in order to be viable in the political arena. Right now, the MB does not seem to be willing to separate its da'wah (propaganda) section from its political body, unlike the Moroccan Justice and Development Party and Jordanian Islamic Action Front. However, in the following days, as the party completes its transformation from a "social movement" to a "political party," and as it indulges in the complexity of working on socio-economic programs, we will see whether or not it will decide to pursue an institutional differentiation.
Monday, February 21, 2011
The February 20th Protests in Morocco
The popular uprising/revolutions, first initiated in Tunisia, created a chain effect which finally spread to Morocco with the February 20th protests. In contrast to the mass gatherings which led to the toppling of the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, the protests in Rabat and various other Moroccan cities did not manage to attract millions in streets. The reasons are surely related to the lack of one-party rule and the existence of multiparty politics despite the immense role of the King Muhammad VI in the political arena. In contrast to the police state of Tunisia which was capable of stifling any critical voice against the state, there is much more freedom of press and assembly in Morocco, which provided people with a greater outlet to channel their grievances.
One of the organizers of the protests declared their goals, including: the dissolution of the government and the parliament which do not reflect the will of people, bringing people who engaged in corruption to justice, especially those who plundered the fortune of the nation, and writing a new constitution which would make the people the only source of authority. In this vein, the protester adds that, "The King should occupy a symbolic status rather than executive and legislatory." Moreover, the activists are also willing see the separation of powers and the judicial reform which will materialize in the real independence of judiciary. Their other demand is the acceptance of the Berber language along with Arabic as an official language of the country.
While these demands attracted some parts of the society, such as Amazigh/Berber organizations, human rights organizations, some leftist parties, some sections of Islamists such as Shabiba Islamiya and Adl wa Ihsan; the PJD (Justice and Development Party), Istiklal party, and Ittihadi Ishtiraki Party abstained from participating in the protests. In this vein, the leader of the PJD, Mr. Benkiran, declared that, "We differ from the February 20th movement concerning some of their demands. We are different from them. They are not political parties, we are a responsible political party. We can not just participate in any random demonstration which calls for protests. Regarding constitutional reform, the PJD had already established a committee studying these issues." What can be inferred from these declarations is that the PJD considers itself to be a party of the establishment, which cannot simply act as an opposition movement against the current political order, and severely criticize the very pillars of the status-quo (see the intra-party conflict and resignations due to Benkiran's decision on the non-participation to the February 20th protests). While refusing direct criticism of the King's omnipotent powers, the PJD is very vocal in acting against the parties (i.e., PAM), which aim to monopolize the political power by exploiting their affinity with the King (at the expense of the PJD). While still pushing for constitutional and judicial reforms by remaining within the boundaries of the status-quo, Benkiran seems to be very determined to take an an offensive position vis-a-vis the PAM which attempts to marginalize and blacken the PJD's stature in the political scene. In order to prevent PAM from turning into another example of an omnipotent single-party, this stern attitude seems to be necessary for the sake of the further democratization of Moroccan politics.
One of the organizers of the protests declared their goals, including: the dissolution of the government and the parliament which do not reflect the will of people, bringing people who engaged in corruption to justice, especially those who plundered the fortune of the nation, and writing a new constitution which would make the people the only source of authority. In this vein, the protester adds that, "The King should occupy a symbolic status rather than executive and legislatory." Moreover, the activists are also willing see the separation of powers and the judicial reform which will materialize in the real independence of judiciary. Their other demand is the acceptance of the Berber language along with Arabic as an official language of the country.
While these demands attracted some parts of the society, such as Amazigh/Berber organizations, human rights organizations, some leftist parties, some sections of Islamists such as Shabiba Islamiya and Adl wa Ihsan; the PJD (Justice and Development Party), Istiklal party, and Ittihadi Ishtiraki Party abstained from participating in the protests. In this vein, the leader of the PJD, Mr. Benkiran, declared that, "We differ from the February 20th movement concerning some of their demands. We are different from them. They are not political parties, we are a responsible political party. We can not just participate in any random demonstration which calls for protests. Regarding constitutional reform, the PJD had already established a committee studying these issues." What can be inferred from these declarations is that the PJD considers itself to be a party of the establishment, which cannot simply act as an opposition movement against the current political order, and severely criticize the very pillars of the status-quo (see the intra-party conflict and resignations due to Benkiran's decision on the non-participation to the February 20th protests). While refusing direct criticism of the King's omnipotent powers, the PJD is very vocal in acting against the parties (i.e., PAM), which aim to monopolize the political power by exploiting their affinity with the King (at the expense of the PJD). While still pushing for constitutional and judicial reforms by remaining within the boundaries of the status-quo, Benkiran seems to be very determined to take an an offensive position vis-a-vis the PAM which attempts to marginalize and blacken the PJD's stature in the political scene. In order to prevent PAM from turning into another example of an omnipotent single-party, this stern attitude seems to be necessary for the sake of the further democratization of Moroccan politics.
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Nationalist Card
One oft witnessed method used to discredit and debase the regime-protesters is to accuse them of being "foreign agents." This is part of a regime strategy to divert the popular attention from domestic politics and troubles to the international platform. By playing the nationalism card, the iron-fist regimes opt to equate the opposition with traitors, who had been allegedly "bought off" by the Western states, including Israel. This attitude can easily be seen in Iranian PM Ahmedinejad's accusations regarding the identity of the protesters in 2009. Similarly, a Syrian activist complains about the Syrian security forces in the latest February 2011 protest by saying, "He (the security agent) accused me of having a website that was 'infiltrated by Israel', describing me as an 'insect' and a 'germ', working against the country’s interests. He lashed out at me as I was answering every word ... He hit me on my left cheek. He kept insulting me ... He opened my suitcase violently and took my mobile phone and my camera. He said 'you are under arrest'."
It is easy for the Syrian state to play the nationalist card since the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights is still under effect. Thus, the ongoing occupation, and lack of any diplomatic relationships trigger more mistrust, misinformation and hatred between the two countries. What is interesting is that this tension ends up formulating weird coalitions across ideologically different groups. For instance, in the Syrian streets, it is very common to see portraits of Ahmedinejad, Nasrullah and Bashar al-Assad side-by-side. I can understand the Islamist overlap between Ahmedinejad and Nasrullah, but does the secular Ba'th ideology really go hand-in-hand with them? Apparently when the issue is about grievances vis-a-vis Israel, it is possible to observe a cross-cut ideological bloc!
In an article published in The Syrian Daypress, the discussion was about whether or not Syrians will take advantage of the latest developments in Egypt. As political analysts agree on the fact that Middle Eastern regimes should take a lesson from the Egyptian example to pay attention to the compatibility between the demands of its citizens and the state, they concur that Syria gained from the events. But in what way? They argue that the toppling of the Mubarak regime, which was at odds with Syria's non-conciliatory position vis-a-vis Israel, will support the Syrian ambitions/plans for finding a solution to the Palestinian problem. Syrian commentators consider the loser of the Egyptian revolution to be Israel, as well as some of the Arab states who previously enjoyed good relations with Egypt, mainly the PLO.
Syrian analysts seem to be too optimistic to think that the post-Mubarak regime will confront the Israeli state similar to the Syrian state. At this time, the Egyptian military does not seem to be willing to abrogate the existing treaties with Israel, and I sincerely doubt that the future Egyptian parliament (which will hopefully reflect all the political currents in the country) will renounce the current peace with Israel by cutting off its financial and political support with the West. If the majority of the Egyptian parliament is made up of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, then their assessment might be true. Since the Muslim Brotherhood is only one section of the opposition, and since they declared that they are not willing to acquire the majority in the parliament and will not nominate a candidate for the presidency, the Syrian analysts seem to be very premature in their analysis.
It is easy for the Syrian state to play the nationalist card since the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights is still under effect. Thus, the ongoing occupation, and lack of any diplomatic relationships trigger more mistrust, misinformation and hatred between the two countries. What is interesting is that this tension ends up formulating weird coalitions across ideologically different groups. For instance, in the Syrian streets, it is very common to see portraits of Ahmedinejad, Nasrullah and Bashar al-Assad side-by-side. I can understand the Islamist overlap between Ahmedinejad and Nasrullah, but does the secular Ba'th ideology really go hand-in-hand with them? Apparently when the issue is about grievances vis-a-vis Israel, it is possible to observe a cross-cut ideological bloc!
In an article published in The Syrian Daypress, the discussion was about whether or not Syrians will take advantage of the latest developments in Egypt. As political analysts agree on the fact that Middle Eastern regimes should take a lesson from the Egyptian example to pay attention to the compatibility between the demands of its citizens and the state, they concur that Syria gained from the events. But in what way? They argue that the toppling of the Mubarak regime, which was at odds with Syria's non-conciliatory position vis-a-vis Israel, will support the Syrian ambitions/plans for finding a solution to the Palestinian problem. Syrian commentators consider the loser of the Egyptian revolution to be Israel, as well as some of the Arab states who previously enjoyed good relations with Egypt, mainly the PLO.
Syrian analysts seem to be too optimistic to think that the post-Mubarak regime will confront the Israeli state similar to the Syrian state. At this time, the Egyptian military does not seem to be willing to abrogate the existing treaties with Israel, and I sincerely doubt that the future Egyptian parliament (which will hopefully reflect all the political currents in the country) will renounce the current peace with Israel by cutting off its financial and political support with the West. If the majority of the Egyptian parliament is made up of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, then their assessment might be true. Since the Muslim Brotherhood is only one section of the opposition, and since they declared that they are not willing to acquire the majority in the parliament and will not nominate a candidate for the presidency, the Syrian analysts seem to be very premature in their analysis.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Silent Syria
While the Egyptians and Tunisians managed to topple their authoritarian dictators, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad seems to be maintaining a solid grip on his "throne." Since 1963, the highly hierarchical and centralized Ba'ath party has been ruling the country without any opposition party or movement. The Syrian state as a result, is embodied in a single political party. Thus, the Ba'ath ideology is the "only game in town." The Ba'ath party, with its totalitarian character, engulfs each and every bit of Syrian society from military, trade unions to student organizations. As the interests and identities of the Ba'ath party and the Syrian military overlapped, any dissent against the regime faced brutal repression by the military. For instance, in February of 1982, in the city of Hama, the military violently clashed with the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency. The army literally leveled the city by using helicopter gunships and bulldozers, killing 20,000 people in total. As the regime did not hesitate to kill its own citizens ferociously, it had guaranteed its survival. For more see: Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, (London: Routledge, 2002)
After this harsh crackdown, the anti-regime opposition lost its fervor and mobilizational power. I doubt that the Syrians are ready, or willing, to confront the one-party rule en masse even today. It seems that the regime is too successful in spreading fear throughout the society. The people in the bazaars, or in meetings with friends, are too scared to talk about politics. They are afraid of the fact that someone asking them a political question might be a member of the Syrian mukhabarat (intelligence service). In case of any criticism they make about the Ba'ath country, they might face a series of interrogations. Whenever a new shop is opened, or some renovations are done in a private enterprise, one important step to do is to buy a nice photo of Bashar al-Asad and hang it on the wall just in case a party sympathizer drops by and sees that there was no sign of regime allegiance. In other words, people are totally de-politicized in order to be on the safe side. When I see Syrians embracing Bashar al-Asad, I am not convinced they do it because they wholeheartly support his cosmetic reforms or his vitality. Maybe, they foresee no opportunity for change and they do not want to be marginalized and play the role of loser in their lives by confronting the status-quo.
Moreover, in comparison to the other more touristic Middle Eastern/Maghrebi countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, we can definitely say that Syria is a much more closed country to outside influence. A vivid civil society life, which will nurture the seed of free discussion and provide citizens with an outlet to channel their grievances, is restricted. Morever, economic privatization is going slower in comparison to most of the Arab states, which impedes the transfer direct foreign investment and ideas to the country. However, the dissemination of the satellite channels and mainly the impact of al-Jazeera provided people with new methods to think critically about the status of the Middle Eastern regimes in general. Thus, these new outlets triggered people to ask questions, criticize and challenge the corrupted governments rather than simply obeying their decrees.
Despite this silence, there are some anti-regime activists in the field (see Al-Jazeera's interview with one of the famous activists, Suhair Atassi). They are calling for political reforms and the cancellation of emergency law, which has been in effect since 1963. They managed to organize and mobilize their protest thanks to social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, calling it a "Day of Rage." They showed up in the famous Bab Touma square. Although it was a peaceful sit-in, Atassi says, they were harassed by regime thugs. Thugs accused them of being Israeli agents. The protest did not manage to attract masses to the square, says NY Times, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt.
The Ba'ath sympathizers are crafty when it comes to coming up with a formula to muzzle the discontented masses. They pose the question, "Do you want chaos, or do you favor stability? While they might be right in the sense that the struggle for freedom comes with many sacrifices such as lives, energy, and money, however democracy-mongers' feat of ousting autocrats makes them proud of themselves (many first time as a free citizen). This success demonstrates to the rest of the world that they are just as capable as everyone else to end tyranny and open the path for free elections and an accountable government.
Who knows when the Syrian opposition will be mobilized and willing to replace the decades of rotten regime with a clean-slate democratic counterpart. I am not very optimistic about this soon to happen as Daypress of Syria put it firmly,"Syrians make it clear the situation in Syria cannot be compared to other countries in the region. “Look what is happening in Egypt now – people don’t want that type of violence here,” said a taxi driver in Damascus yesterday."
After this harsh crackdown, the anti-regime opposition lost its fervor and mobilizational power. I doubt that the Syrians are ready, or willing, to confront the one-party rule en masse even today. It seems that the regime is too successful in spreading fear throughout the society. The people in the bazaars, or in meetings with friends, are too scared to talk about politics. They are afraid of the fact that someone asking them a political question might be a member of the Syrian mukhabarat (intelligence service). In case of any criticism they make about the Ba'ath country, they might face a series of interrogations. Whenever a new shop is opened, or some renovations are done in a private enterprise, one important step to do is to buy a nice photo of Bashar al-Asad and hang it on the wall just in case a party sympathizer drops by and sees that there was no sign of regime allegiance. In other words, people are totally de-politicized in order to be on the safe side. When I see Syrians embracing Bashar al-Asad, I am not convinced they do it because they wholeheartly support his cosmetic reforms or his vitality. Maybe, they foresee no opportunity for change and they do not want to be marginalized and play the role of loser in their lives by confronting the status-quo.
Moreover, in comparison to the other more touristic Middle Eastern/Maghrebi countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, we can definitely say that Syria is a much more closed country to outside influence. A vivid civil society life, which will nurture the seed of free discussion and provide citizens with an outlet to channel their grievances, is restricted. Morever, economic privatization is going slower in comparison to most of the Arab states, which impedes the transfer direct foreign investment and ideas to the country. However, the dissemination of the satellite channels and mainly the impact of al-Jazeera provided people with new methods to think critically about the status of the Middle Eastern regimes in general. Thus, these new outlets triggered people to ask questions, criticize and challenge the corrupted governments rather than simply obeying their decrees.
Despite this silence, there are some anti-regime activists in the field (see Al-Jazeera's interview with one of the famous activists, Suhair Atassi). They are calling for political reforms and the cancellation of emergency law, which has been in effect since 1963. They managed to organize and mobilize their protest thanks to social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, calling it a "Day of Rage." They showed up in the famous Bab Touma square. Although it was a peaceful sit-in, Atassi says, they were harassed by regime thugs. Thugs accused them of being Israeli agents. The protest did not manage to attract masses to the square, says NY Times, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt.
The Ba'ath sympathizers are crafty when it comes to coming up with a formula to muzzle the discontented masses. They pose the question, "Do you want chaos, or do you favor stability? While they might be right in the sense that the struggle for freedom comes with many sacrifices such as lives, energy, and money, however democracy-mongers' feat of ousting autocrats makes them proud of themselves (many first time as a free citizen). This success demonstrates to the rest of the world that they are just as capable as everyone else to end tyranny and open the path for free elections and an accountable government.
Who knows when the Syrian opposition will be mobilized and willing to replace the decades of rotten regime with a clean-slate democratic counterpart. I am not very optimistic about this soon to happen as Daypress of Syria put it firmly,"Syrians make it clear the situation in Syria cannot be compared to other countries in the region. “Look what is happening in Egypt now – people don’t want that type of violence here,” said a taxi driver in Damascus yesterday."
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