The February 20th Protests in Morocco

The popular uprising/revolutions, first initiated in Tunisia, created a chain effect which finally spread to Morocco with the February 20th protests. In contrast to the mass gatherings which led to the toppling of the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, the protests in Rabat and various other Moroccan cities did not manage to attract millions in streets. The reasons are surely related to the lack of one-party rule and the existence of multiparty politics despite the immense role of the King Muhammad VI in the political arena. In contrast to the police state of Tunisia which was capable of stifling any critical voice against the state, there is much more freedom of press and assembly in Morocco, which provided people with a greater outlet to channel their grievances.

One of the organizers of the protests declared their goals, including: the dissolution of the government and the parliament which do not reflect the will of people, bringing people who engaged in corruption to justice, especially those who plundered the fortune of the nation, and writing a new constitution which would make the people the only source of authority. In this vein, the protester adds that, "The King should occupy a symbolic status rather than executive and legislatory."  Moreover, the activists are also willing see the separation of powers and the judicial reform which will materialize in the real independence of judiciary. Their other demand is the acceptance of the Berber language along with Arabic as an official language of the country.

While these demands attracted some parts of the society, such as Amazigh/Berber organizations, human rights organizations, some leftist parties, some sections of Islamists such as Shabiba Islamiya and Adl wa Ihsan; the  PJD (Justice and Development Party), Istiklal party, and Ittihadi Ishtiraki Party abstained from participating in the protests. In this vein, the leader of the PJD, Mr. Benkiran, declared that, "We differ from the February 20th movement concerning some of their demands. We are different from them. They are not political parties, we are a responsible political party. We can not just participate in any random demonstration which calls for protests. Regarding constitutional reform, the PJD had already established a committee studying these issues." What can be inferred from these declarations is that the PJD considers itself to be a party of the establishment, which cannot simply act as an opposition movement against the current political order, and severely criticize the very pillars of the status-quo (see the intra-party conflict and resignations due to Benkiran's decision on the non-participation to the February 20th protests).  While refusing direct criticism of  the King's omnipotent powers, the PJD is very vocal in acting against the parties (i.e., PAM), which aim to monopolize the political power by exploiting their affinity with the King (at the expense of the PJD). While still pushing for constitutional and judicial reforms by remaining within the boundaries of the status-quo, Benkiran seems to be very determined to take an an offensive position vis-a-vis the PAM which attempts to marginalize and blacken the PJD's stature in the political scene. In order to prevent PAM from turning into another example of an omnipotent single-party, this stern attitude seems to be necessary for the sake of the further democratization of Moroccan politics.

Nationalist Card

One oft witnessed method used to discredit and debase the regime-protesters is to accuse them of being "foreign agents." This is part of a regime strategy to divert the popular attention from domestic politics and troubles to the international platform.  By playing the nationalism card, the iron-fist regimes opt to equate the opposition with traitors, who had been allegedly "bought off" by the Western states, including Israel. This attitude can easily be seen in Iranian PM Ahmedinejad's accusations regarding the identity of the protesters in 2009. Similarly, a Syrian activist complains about the Syrian security forces in the latest February 2011 protest by saying, "He (the security agent) accused me of having a website that was 'infiltrated by Israel', describing me as an 'insect' and a 'germ', working against the country’s interests. He lashed out at me as I was answering every word ... He hit me on my left cheek. He kept insulting me ... He opened my suitcase violently and took my mobile phone and my camera. He said 'you are under arrest'."

It is easy for the Syrian state to play the nationalist card since the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights is still under effect. Thus, the ongoing occupation, and lack of any diplomatic relationships trigger more mistrust, misinformation and hatred between the two countries. What is interesting is that this tension ends up formulating weird coalitions across ideologically different groups. For instance, in the Syrian streets, it is very common to see portraits of Ahmedinejad, Nasrullah and Bashar al-Assad side-by-side. I can understand the Islamist overlap between Ahmedinejad and Nasrullah, but does the secular Ba'th ideology really go hand-in-hand with them? Apparently when the issue is about grievances vis-a-vis Israel, it is possible to observe a cross-cut ideological bloc!

In an article published in The Syrian Daypress, the discussion was about whether or not Syrians will take advantage of the latest developments in Egypt. As political analysts agree on the fact that Middle Eastern regimes should take a lesson from the Egyptian example to pay attention to the compatibility between the demands of its citizens and the state, they concur that Syria gained from the events. But in what way?  They argue that the toppling of the Mubarak regime, which was at odds with Syria's non-conciliatory position vis-a-vis Israel, will support the Syrian ambitions/plans for finding a solution to the Palestinian problem. Syrian commentators consider the loser of the Egyptian revolution to be Israel, as well as some of the Arab states who previously enjoyed  good relations with Egypt, mainly the PLO.

Syrian analysts seem to be too optimistic to think that the post-Mubarak regime will confront the Israeli state similar to the Syrian state. At this time, the Egyptian military does not seem to be willing to abrogate the existing treaties with Israel, and I sincerely doubt that the future Egyptian parliament (which will hopefully reflect all the political currents in the country) will renounce the current peace with Israel by cutting off its financial and political support with the West. If the majority of the Egyptian parliament is made up of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, then their assessment might be true. Since the Muslim Brotherhood is only one section of the opposition, and since they declared that they are not willing to acquire the majority in the parliament and will not nominate a candidate for the presidency, the Syrian analysts seem to be very premature in their analysis.

 

Silent Syria

While the Egyptians and Tunisians managed to topple their authoritarian dictators, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad seems to be maintaining a solid grip on his "throne."  Since 1963, the highly hierarchical and centralized Ba'ath party has been ruling the country without any opposition party or movement. The Syrian state as a result, is embodied in a single political party. Thus, the Ba'ath ideology is the "only game in town." The Ba'ath party, with its totalitarian character, engulfs each and every bit of Syrian society from military, trade unions to student organizations.  As the interests and identities of the Ba'ath party and the Syrian military overlapped, any dissent against the regime faced brutal repression by the military. For instance, in February of 1982, in the city of Hama, the military violently clashed with the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency. The army literally leveled the city by using helicopter gunships and bulldozers, killing 20,000 people in total. As the regime did not hesitate to kill its own citizens ferociously, it had guaranteed its survival. For more see: Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, (London: Routledge, 2002)


After this harsh crackdown, the anti-regime opposition lost its fervor and mobilizational power. I doubt that the Syrians are ready, or willing, to confront the one-party rule en masse even today. It seems that the regime is too successful in spreading fear throughout the society. The people in the bazaars, or in meetings with friends, are too scared to talk about politics. They are afraid of the fact that someone asking them a political question might be a member of the Syrian mukhabarat (intelligence service). In case of any criticism they make about the Ba'ath country, they might face a series of interrogations. Whenever a new shop is opened, or some renovations are done in a private enterprise, one important step to do is to buy a nice photo of Bashar al-Asad and hang it on the wall just in case a party sympathizer drops by and sees that there was no sign of regime allegiance.  In other words, people are totally de-politicized in order to be on the safe side. When I see Syrians embracing Bashar al-Asad, I am not convinced they do it because they wholeheartly support his cosmetic reforms or his vitality. Maybe, they foresee no opportunity for change and they do not want to be marginalized and play the role of loser in their lives by confronting the status-quo.

Moreover, in comparison to the other more touristic Middle Eastern/Maghrebi countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, we can definitely say that Syria is a much more closed country to outside influence. A vivid civil society life, which will nurture the seed of free discussion and provide citizens with an outlet to channel their grievances, is restricted. Morever, economic privatization is going slower in comparison to most of the Arab states, which impedes the transfer direct foreign investment and ideas to the country. However, the dissemination of the satellite channels and mainly the impact of al-Jazeera provided people with new methods to think critically about the status of the Middle Eastern regimes in general. Thus, these new outlets triggered people to ask questions, criticize and challenge the corrupted governments rather than simply obeying their decrees.      

Despite this silence, there are some anti-regime activists in the field (see Al-Jazeera's interview with one of the famous activists, Suhair Atassi). They are calling for political reforms and the cancellation of emergency law, which has been in effect since 1963. They managed to organize and mobilize their protest thanks to social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, calling it a "Day of Rage." They showed up in the famous Bab Touma square. Although it was a peaceful sit-in, Atassi says, they were harassed by regime thugs. Thugs accused them of being Israeli agents. The protest did not manage to attract masses to the square, says NY Times, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt.

The Ba'ath sympathizers are crafty when it comes to coming up with a formula to muzzle the discontented masses. They pose the question, "Do you want chaos, or do you favor stability?  While they might be right in the sense that the struggle for freedom comes with many sacrifices such as lives, energy, and money, however democracy-mongers' feat of ousting autocrats makes them proud of themselves (many first time as a free citizen).  This success demonstrates to the rest of the world that they are just as capable as everyone else to end tyranny and open the path for free elections and an accountable government.

Who knows when the Syrian opposition will be mobilized and willing to replace the decades of rotten regime with a clean-slate democratic counterpart. I am not very optimistic about this soon to happen as Daypress of Syria put it firmly,"Syrians make it clear the situation in Syria cannot be compared to other countries in the region. “Look what is happening in Egypt now – people don’t want that type of violence here,” said a taxi driver in Damascus yesterday."
 

Güzel Allahım Sen Nelere Kadirsin

14 Şubat.. Yıllardan 1995. Milli Gazete.."Hakkın gelip Batılın zail olduğu" mekan..

Abdullah Gül, Türkiye'nin Gümrük Birliği'ne girmesinin ekonomik değil, ideolojik ve siyasi olduğunu belirtip "Türkiye, AB'ye üye olmadan Gümrük Birliği'ne girecek ilk ülke olacaktır. Bu, ülkenin bağımsızlığının egemenliğinin devri anlamına gelmektedir."

Partiler çeşitli baskılar altında kaldıklarında kıblelerini değiştirme konusunda oldukça ustadırlar. Askerden kaçıp, tükaka Avrupa'ya sığınmak da bu olsa gerek!

Sevgiyle kalın! 

Revolutions in Comparison: Egypt vs. Iran

While taking a low profile in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary process, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) reiterated the heterogeneous character of the anti-Mubarak protests. They called the uprising a "popular revolution," composed of Muslims, Christians, youths, and all levels of society. By this, they insinuated that they are not in favor of monopolizing the revolution, nor the post-revolutionary arrangements. 

Although the mixed structure of the Egyptian revolution reminds us of the Iranian revolution, in Egypt we do not have a hierarchical and independent religious entity which had functioned as a counter-regime force as was witnessed in Iran. The famous religious institution, al-Azhar, has been nothing more than an instrument of the state in the Egyptian context. Thus, it has been co-opted by the state, which in turn mars its legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

In lieu of the corrupted and illegitimate Shah's regime, the Imamate offered an alternative source of legitimacy, leadership, and solidarity, which the aggrieved people desperately needed. Humeyni introduced the theoretical underpinnings of his political move by putting the velayet-i fakih system into the forefront. This enabled the religious class to exert their influence on politics. The clergy which assumed the responsibilities of the Hidden Imam in his absence would not be restricted to the socio-moral platform but would blaze the trail in politics. Moreover, despite the composite profile of the activists in the Iranian revolution, the religious dimension was much more visible due to religious mobilizing vehicles, such as the usage of mosques as meeting points and the circulation of Humeyni's audio-cassettes throughout the country ( let us not forget the coalition between the bazaaris and mullahs). Whereas in Egypt, despite having vast support from the religious masses, the majority of the leadership cadre of the Muslim Brotherhood are laymen who are devoid of clerical upperhand as witnessed in Iran. I sincerely doubt that any member in the high echelon of the Muslim Brotherhood has the enormous religious charisma which Humeyni enjoyed back in the 1970s. Moreover, instead of forming the backbone of the anti-Mubarak uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood was even slow to participate in the January 25th protests at the beginning, mainly in order to avoid repeating its past experiences of heavy repression. And some part of radical Islamists even refused to participate in the elections, and chose not to support the revolution with the same concerns of the MB.  

Moreover, transitional politics can not be analyzed excluding the role of the international environment of the country under change. In Iran, the Iran-Iraq war diverted the attention of the people from domestic to  international politics. In this vein, it provided mullahs with a chance to solidify the institutionalization of the Islamic revolutionary institutions. Facing an external threat to their very existence, the people united around the state in order to challenge Iraq. Thus, instability in the international domain paved the way for deepening the Islamicization of the post-transitional politics. On the contrary, Egypt does not face any external threat which would slow down the democratization process within the country.

The Muslim Brotherhood: We do not want a religious state like in Iran!

The middle of the way Islamist groups' situation is really difficult. They are not welcomed by the secular forces and are considered to be radical forces waiting to overthrow the so-called secular regimes. And they are deemed by the radical Islamists, who are in favor of a global jihad, as "sell-outs."  Moreover, the autocratic regimes, such as in Egypt, had tried to portray the moderate Islamist groups as radicals in order to maintain the support of the Western powers (on this topic see Mustafa Ashur's article).

On February 8th, 2011, the current leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammed Badi', asserted, "Some people are accusing us of wanting to establish a religious state like in Iran. We  are not seeking to gain political clout, and we do not want the presidency. We do not aim to acquire the majority in parliament. We do, however, aspire to acquire all-inclusive reforms in the political, economic, social, and educational domains. We do aspire to have a civil democratic state with a religious reference." This does not sound to be very different from what the rest of the moderate Islamist political forces in other Middle Eastern states have asserted regarding their "Islamist identity." Actually, not using the word "shari'ah" but the utilization of "religious reference" to identify their goals in this statement even demonstrated to us the signs of moderation. When the moderate Islamists participate in the parliamentarian politics, what constitues the "Islamic reference" ends up being either a specific constitutional article linking the country's identity to Islam, and/or a focus on Islamic values in educational and social platforms.
Thus, moderate Islamist parties which act with a bevy of different political parties within parliament are not in a position to bring a comprehensive alteration of the constitution. At most, they would opt for the civil personal code to be based on shari'ah, as was the case in Morocco and Jordan. Concerning the rest of the constitution, one way or another, moderate Islamists are destined to resort to Western jurisprudence where shari'ah has not sufficiently developed to give an answer to the complicated global issues of today.

Egyptian Revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood

Despite being the primary opponent of the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) accepted to participate in the initial negotiations upon the request of the vice-President, Omar Suleiman.  When asked why the MB participated in these talks, a member of the MB's Guidance Bureau, Saad al-Katatni replied, "We put forward our stipulations, such as the participation of the all political forces and parties in Egypt, all the representatives of the political currents in Tahrir square and that this would not be a bilateral talk" (see al-Katatni's interview with Islam Online). When these demands were satisfied, they agreed to participate in the talks. This for sure gives us a clear sign that the MB does not opt to play an outsider role in the post-Mubarak transitional process. If the MB accepts to be an actor in this transitional attempt directed by a regime which they detested and suffered under for decades, they would gladly be willing to be an effective force in the democratic future of their country. Their current strategy seems very cautious, as Saad al-Katatni declared that, "It is not in our agenda to participate in the presidential election or participate in the government." In this vein, they seem to follow the tadarruj (step-by-step) method akin to the rest of the moderate Islamist parties in the Middle East. By this way, they guarantee their legitimate share in the new political game and they do not create another "Algerian scenario" by intimidating the secular forces within the country and in the West.

We will see what will happen to the MB's internal political formation as the they continue to integrate themselves in the transitional politics. The group has different factions (reformist vs. status-quo) who put forward different agendas for molding its political future.  The developments will demonstrate to us whether or not the MB will continue its comprehensive Islamist movement da'wah-cum-political actions or accept to evolve towards being a political party similar to their Jordanian and Moroccan counterparts. Transforming into a political entity will turn the group into being a more pluralist and pragmatist. While a prominent member of the Guidance Bureau, Dr. Aryan, is apparently not willing to give up the comprehensive structure of the group (source), the MB might resort to some concessions in order to guarantee its maintenance in the new political game. A probable non-shari'ah based constitution, the coexistence with the rest of the non-Islamic political parties, and the continuing peaceful status with the MB's arch-enemy, Israel, would be the main issue-areas in which MB would undergo a moderation test. At this critical juncture, staying out of the transitional politics would mean losing the historical advantage to attain the legitimacy they are looking forward to achieving after many decades. Furthermore, if the party continues its rigid position of non-moderation, it will face the consequence of being marginalized, which the group has been fighting against since the 1980s.

Lady Mary Worthley Montagu Üzerine

Lady Montagu 1689 ve 1762 yılları arasında yaşamış Ingiliz aristokratı ve yazar. Eşi Edward Wortley Montagu'nun İstanbul'a büyükelçi tayin edilmesiyle yaklaşık bir sene (1717-1718) bu şehirde ikamet etmiş. Osmanlı'ya dair anılarını, "The Turkish Embassy Letters" adlı kitabında ayrıntılarıyla bulmanız mümkün. Lady Montagu'yu diğer Orientalist yazarlardan ayıran nokta yaşadığı süre zarfında topluma yabancı kalmayıp, Osmanlıyı Osmanlının gözünden görmeye çalışması, toplumla derinlemesine kaynaşması, yaşadığı deneyimleri ayrıntılarıyla not etmesi ve diğer Orientalist iddialara karşı çıkması.. Türkçe ögreniyor, sokakta rahat gezebilmek için ferace takıyor, Türk hamamlarına gidiyor, asilzadeTürk hanımlarının davetlerine iştirak ediyor..Kitap oldukça zevkle okunuyor.. Montagu tespitlerinde oldukça gerçekçi, detaylı, şaşırtıcı ve kimi zaman gülümsetici...

Türk kadınlarını baskılar altında ezilen ve aşağılanan şekilde yansıtan diğer Orientalist yazarları eleştirirken şöyle diyor Montagu "Türk kadınları dünyadaki tüm kadınlardan daha özgür...Kesintisiz zevk içinde yaşıyorlar, tüm zamanlarını hamamlara gidip, yeni modalar keşfedip, para harcamakla geçiriyorlar. Kocalarının işi para kazanmak, kadınların işi ise harcamak."(134) Montagu'nun bu tür rahat bir hayata öykünmesi Ingiltere'deki yoğun bilimsel çalışmalar ortamında duyduğu zihni yorgunluk olsa gerek.(142) Bizim de bu tür yaşantıyı özlediğimiz zamanlar yok mu dersiniz? "Evet feraceleri var, diyor Montagu, dışarı çıkarken bunları takıyorlar.. Bu onların hem dışarda kölelerinden bile farklı görünmelerini engelliyor hem de en kıskanç kocaların bile eşlerini sokakta tanımalarına imkan vermiyor. Hiçbir erkek onlara dokunamıyor ve onları takip edemiyor." (71)  Edirne'de tanıştığı Paşazade Ahmet Bey'in de oldukça etkisinde kalır Lady Montagu. Nükteli kişilige sahip Ahmet Bey şöyle der Montaguya kadınları kapatma konusunda "Sizle aramızda pek fark yok aslında, sadece eşlerimiz bizi aldattıklarında, bunun farkına varamıyoruz feraceden ötürü." (54) Çok eşliliğe de değinmeden geçmiyor yazarımız "Şeriat kanunları,diyor, dört kadına kadar evlenme izni vermiş erkeklere, fakat kalburüstü hiç bir erkek buna yeltenmiyor ve kadınlar bundan yana sıkıntı çekmiyorlar." (72)

Osmanlı'daki "kölelik" kurumu hakkında şunları ekliyor Montagu "Türkleri kölelerine muamelerinden dolayı alkışlıyorum. Hiç bir zaman kötü muamele görmüyorlar, onların köleliliği hizmetçilikten daha kötü bir düzeyde değil. Evet maaşları yok ama, bizim hizmetçilerimize vergimiz aylıktan daha çok giyim kuşam veriyor sahipleri onlara. Hristiyan şehirlerinde alım satılmaları çok daha berbat."(130)

Selam olsun Lady Montagu'ya, Selam olsun o günlere!

Lady Mary Worthley Montagu, The Turkish Embassy Letters, London: Virago, 1993.

Fransız ressam Jean Auguste Ingres'nin (1780-1867), Lady Montagu anılarından esinlenip yaptığı "Odalisque with a Slave" tablosu.