The February 20th Protests in Morocco

The popular uprising/revolutions, first initiated in Tunisia, created a chain effect which finally spread to Morocco with the February 20th protests. In contrast to the mass gatherings which led to the toppling of the authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, the protests in Rabat and various other Moroccan cities did not manage to attract millions in streets. The reasons are surely related to the lack of one-party rule and the existence of multiparty politics despite the immense role of the King Muhammad VI in the political arena. In contrast to the police state of Tunisia which was capable of stifling any critical voice against the state, there is much more freedom of press and assembly in Morocco, which provided people with a greater outlet to channel their grievances.

One of the organizers of the protests declared their goals, including: the dissolution of the government and the parliament which do not reflect the will of people, bringing people who engaged in corruption to justice, especially those who plundered the fortune of the nation, and writing a new constitution which would make the people the only source of authority. In this vein, the protester adds that, "The King should occupy a symbolic status rather than executive and legislatory."  Moreover, the activists are also willing see the separation of powers and the judicial reform which will materialize in the real independence of judiciary. Their other demand is the acceptance of the Berber language along with Arabic as an official language of the country.

While these demands attracted some parts of the society, such as Amazigh/Berber organizations, human rights organizations, some leftist parties, some sections of Islamists such as Shabiba Islamiya and Adl wa Ihsan; the  PJD (Justice and Development Party), Istiklal party, and Ittihadi Ishtiraki Party abstained from participating in the protests. In this vein, the leader of the PJD, Mr. Benkiran, declared that, "We differ from the February 20th movement concerning some of their demands. We are different from them. They are not political parties, we are a responsible political party. We can not just participate in any random demonstration which calls for protests. Regarding constitutional reform, the PJD had already established a committee studying these issues." What can be inferred from these declarations is that the PJD considers itself to be a party of the establishment, which cannot simply act as an opposition movement against the current political order, and severely criticize the very pillars of the status-quo (see the intra-party conflict and resignations due to Benkiran's decision on the non-participation to the February 20th protests).  While refusing direct criticism of  the King's omnipotent powers, the PJD is very vocal in acting against the parties (i.e., PAM), which aim to monopolize the political power by exploiting their affinity with the King (at the expense of the PJD). While still pushing for constitutional and judicial reforms by remaining within the boundaries of the status-quo, Benkiran seems to be very determined to take an an offensive position vis-a-vis the PAM which attempts to marginalize and blacken the PJD's stature in the political scene. In order to prevent PAM from turning into another example of an omnipotent single-party, this stern attitude seems to be necessary for the sake of the further democratization of Moroccan politics.