Revolutions in Comparison: Egypt vs. Iran

While taking a low profile in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary process, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) reiterated the heterogeneous character of the anti-Mubarak protests. They called the uprising a "popular revolution," composed of Muslims, Christians, youths, and all levels of society. By this, they insinuated that they are not in favor of monopolizing the revolution, nor the post-revolutionary arrangements. 

Although the mixed structure of the Egyptian revolution reminds us of the Iranian revolution, in Egypt we do not have a hierarchical and independent religious entity which had functioned as a counter-regime force as was witnessed in Iran. The famous religious institution, al-Azhar, has been nothing more than an instrument of the state in the Egyptian context. Thus, it has been co-opted by the state, which in turn mars its legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

In lieu of the corrupted and illegitimate Shah's regime, the Imamate offered an alternative source of legitimacy, leadership, and solidarity, which the aggrieved people desperately needed. Humeyni introduced the theoretical underpinnings of his political move by putting the velayet-i fakih system into the forefront. This enabled the religious class to exert their influence on politics. The clergy which assumed the responsibilities of the Hidden Imam in his absence would not be restricted to the socio-moral platform but would blaze the trail in politics. Moreover, despite the composite profile of the activists in the Iranian revolution, the religious dimension was much more visible due to religious mobilizing vehicles, such as the usage of mosques as meeting points and the circulation of Humeyni's audio-cassettes throughout the country ( let us not forget the coalition between the bazaaris and mullahs). Whereas in Egypt, despite having vast support from the religious masses, the majority of the leadership cadre of the Muslim Brotherhood are laymen who are devoid of clerical upperhand as witnessed in Iran. I sincerely doubt that any member in the high echelon of the Muslim Brotherhood has the enormous religious charisma which Humeyni enjoyed back in the 1970s. Moreover, instead of forming the backbone of the anti-Mubarak uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood was even slow to participate in the January 25th protests at the beginning, mainly in order to avoid repeating its past experiences of heavy repression. And some part of radical Islamists even refused to participate in the elections, and chose not to support the revolution with the same concerns of the MB.  

Moreover, transitional politics can not be analyzed excluding the role of the international environment of the country under change. In Iran, the Iran-Iraq war diverted the attention of the people from domestic to  international politics. In this vein, it provided mullahs with a chance to solidify the institutionalization of the Islamic revolutionary institutions. Facing an external threat to their very existence, the people united around the state in order to challenge Iraq. Thus, instability in the international domain paved the way for deepening the Islamicization of the post-transitional politics. On the contrary, Egypt does not face any external threat which would slow down the democratization process within the country.