Nationalist Card

One oft witnessed method used to discredit and debase the regime-protesters is to accuse them of being "foreign agents." This is part of a regime strategy to divert the popular attention from domestic politics and troubles to the international platform.  By playing the nationalism card, the iron-fist regimes opt to equate the opposition with traitors, who had been allegedly "bought off" by the Western states, including Israel. This attitude can easily be seen in Iranian PM Ahmedinejad's accusations regarding the identity of the protesters in 2009. Similarly, a Syrian activist complains about the Syrian security forces in the latest February 2011 protest by saying, "He (the security agent) accused me of having a website that was 'infiltrated by Israel', describing me as an 'insect' and a 'germ', working against the country’s interests. He lashed out at me as I was answering every word ... He hit me on my left cheek. He kept insulting me ... He opened my suitcase violently and took my mobile phone and my camera. He said 'you are under arrest'."

It is easy for the Syrian state to play the nationalist card since the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights is still under effect. Thus, the ongoing occupation, and lack of any diplomatic relationships trigger more mistrust, misinformation and hatred between the two countries. What is interesting is that this tension ends up formulating weird coalitions across ideologically different groups. For instance, in the Syrian streets, it is very common to see portraits of Ahmedinejad, Nasrullah and Bashar al-Assad side-by-side. I can understand the Islamist overlap between Ahmedinejad and Nasrullah, but does the secular Ba'th ideology really go hand-in-hand with them? Apparently when the issue is about grievances vis-a-vis Israel, it is possible to observe a cross-cut ideological bloc!

In an article published in The Syrian Daypress, the discussion was about whether or not Syrians will take advantage of the latest developments in Egypt. As political analysts agree on the fact that Middle Eastern regimes should take a lesson from the Egyptian example to pay attention to the compatibility between the demands of its citizens and the state, they concur that Syria gained from the events. But in what way?  They argue that the toppling of the Mubarak regime, which was at odds with Syria's non-conciliatory position vis-a-vis Israel, will support the Syrian ambitions/plans for finding a solution to the Palestinian problem. Syrian commentators consider the loser of the Egyptian revolution to be Israel, as well as some of the Arab states who previously enjoyed  good relations with Egypt, mainly the PLO.

Syrian analysts seem to be too optimistic to think that the post-Mubarak regime will confront the Israeli state similar to the Syrian state. At this time, the Egyptian military does not seem to be willing to abrogate the existing treaties with Israel, and I sincerely doubt that the future Egyptian parliament (which will hopefully reflect all the political currents in the country) will renounce the current peace with Israel by cutting off its financial and political support with the West. If the majority of the Egyptian parliament is made up of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, then their assessment might be true. Since the Muslim Brotherhood is only one section of the opposition, and since they declared that they are not willing to acquire the majority in the parliament and will not nominate a candidate for the presidency, the Syrian analysts seem to be very premature in their analysis.